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Abstract 
Income is the most commonly used measure of material well-being. In a modern-day mixed 
economy, such as the UK, an individual’s money income is the preeminent measure of their 
command over resources. This chapter describes the UK income distribution and how it has 
evolved over the last 50 years. It also includes some comparisons with the income 
distributions of other rich countries. The chapter provides multiple perspectives on the 
distribution of income over time focus on both the top and the bottom of the distribution as 
well as the spread of incomes: there is evidence about real income levels and inequality, and 
the prevalence of affluence and of poverty. 
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1 
Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a picture of advantage and disadvantage in Britain using the lens 
provided by the most commonly-used measure of individuals’ material well-being, the 
income of the household to which they belong. Income is not the only indicator that may be 
used to characterise whether an individual is badly-off or well-off or to summarise the extent 
of poverty and affluence in a country overall. Complementary perspectives are provided by 
information about social inclusion and exclusion measured by a set of material deprivation 
indicators (Chapter 1), individuals’ capabilities and functionings (Chapter 2), whether their 
human rights are realised (Chapter 3), or their social class (Chapter 4). Nonetheless, income-
based measures are particularly important. In a modern-day mixed economy such as the 
UK’s, individuals’ money income (and their wealth, treated in Chapter 8) is the preeminent 
measure of their command over resources. For this reason, income is the principal focus of 
the statistics used to assess social progress in the UK and other rich countries. The strengths 
and weaknesses of using income to measure material living standards are not reviewed here. 
Instead, the aim of this chapter is to describe the distribution of income in the UK today, 
documenting how it has changed over the last 50 years and how it compares with those of 
international comparators such as other European and OECD countries.  
The chapter provides multiple perspectives on the income distribution. I discuss 
evidence about the real income levels and inequality, as well as the prevalence of poverty and 
of affluence. In the concluding section, I reflect on some of the issues raised by the evidence. 
First, however, I explain the definitions and sources used in the chapter. 
 
Definitions and sources 
 
Throughout the chapter (with an exception discussed below), an individual’s ‘income’ is the 
equivalised net income of the household to which he or she belongs. This is equal to the total 
money income received by all household members from all sources minus income taxes and 
national insurance contributions paid and some other deductions, deflated by an equivalence 
scale factor that adjusts for differences in household size and composition, and adjusted using 
a price index to take account of inflation. A household is a ‘single person or group of people 
living at the same address as their only or main residence, who either share one meal a day 
together or share the living accommodation (i.e. living room)’ (Department for Work and 
Pensions 2014a: 227). 
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The specific money income sources included in the net income definition are those 
used by the Department for Work and Pensions’ (DWP’s) Households Below Average 
Income (HBAI) statistics are shown in Table 7.1. (These statistics are the UK’s official 
statistics about the income distribution among persons.) Incomes are reported on a weekly 
basis. If someone reports earnings or other receipts over a longer period (e.g. an annual or 
monthly salary), the amount is converted to a weekly-equivalent amount pro rata.  
 
Table 7.1 The definition and sources of net household income: receipts and deductions 
 Income sources: receipts and deductions: 
 (a) usual gross earnings from employment  
+ (b) earnings from subsidiary employment  
+ (c) profit or loss from self-employment 
+ (d) income from social security benefits and tax credits  
+ (e) private and occupational pensions 
+ (f) income from investments and saving 
+ (g) private transfers and other income 
– (h) income tax paid (employees and self-employed) 
– (i) local tax paid (Council tax) 
– (j) National Insurance contributions (employee and self-employed) 
– (k) contributions to occupational pension schemes 
= Net household income before the deduction of housing costs (‘BHC’) 
   
– (l) Housing costs: rent (gross of housing benefits), mortgage interest payments, water rates and other 
water charges, structural insurance payments (owner-occupiers), and ground rent and service charges 
= Net household income after the deduction of housing costs (‘AHC’) 
Notes. Equivalised net household income is equal to net household income divided by an equivalence scale (to 
adjust for differences in household size and composition). Incomes in different years are adjusted by a year-
specific price index to express them in constant purchasing power terms. See main text for further details. 
 
There is an important distinction between net income before the deduction of housing 
costs (net income BHC) and net income after the deduction of housing costs (net income 
AHC). The HBAI statistics report income distribution estimates based on both definitions; the 
BHC definition is the one that is used by international organisations such as Eurostat and the 
OECD, and international data providers such as the Luxembourg Income Study, and is 
consistent with the recommendations of bodies such as the Expert Group on Household 
Income Statistics (2001). For this reason, my discussion focuses on distributions based on the 
net income BHC definition, but I also refer to AHC distributions measures where they lead to 
different conclusions about distributional trends. Observe that an increase in someone’s 
Housing Benefit to cover an increase in their rent would be counted as an increase in their 
income according to the BHC measure even though the household’s net spending power 
would be unchanged. Also, BHC measures do not take account of variations in housing costs, 
and a given amount of income will go less far in areas with high housing costs. On the other 
hand, AHC measures do not reflect the fact that housing costs represent choices made by 
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households about how they live. Among households with the same AHC income, those 
choosing to spend a higher share of their income on higher quality housing will be counted as 
having a better standard of living than those living in cheap, poor quality housing. For further 
discussion of BHC and AHC measures, see Johnson and Webb (1992).  
In order to compare real living standards over time in constant purchasing power 
terms, taking account of the fact that £1 in 1990 is worth more than a £1 in 2000 because of 
inflation, all incomes are adjusted using a price index and expressed in the prices of a 
particular year (financial year 2012–13 below). This assumes that all groups in society 
experience same rate of price inflation. Evidence about differences in experience of inflation 
is provided by Flower and Wales (2014). 
Equivalisation produces a measure of real living standards that is comparable across 
households in a given year. A money income of £500 per week (say) leads to higher living 
standards for a single householder than a childless married couple or a family of four. 
Looking at per capita income (total income divided by household size) would be one way of 
taking account of this issue, but this adjustment would not take account of potential 
economies of scale in the provision of household goods and services such as space, heat and 
light, food preparation and purchase, and so on. According to HBAI definitions, a net 
household income (BHC) of £500 per week for a married couple is equivalent in living 
standards terms to £750 pounds per week for a single householder (£500 is two-thirds not 
one-half of £750). Children add to household needs, of course, but not as much as an 
additional adult. According to HBAI definitions, a net household income of £500 per week 
corresponds to £417 per week in living standards’ terms for a married couple with one child 
(aged less than 14 years), or £357 per week if there are two children. These adjustments are 
characterised as the so-called modified-OECD equivalence scale: see DWP (2014b) for 
further details and note the slightly different adjustment applied to AHC incomes. 
 The final step in defining the income distribution is the assumption that the household 
income total is shared equally within each household, so that each individual is attributed the 
equivalised income of the household to which he or she belongs. Individuals without income 
of their own, such as children, are assumed to benefit from income transfers by other 
individuals within the household. Supposing that complete income sharing is the universal 
rule is undoubtedly inaccurate, but it is also difficult to imagine what other assumptions 
would be more appropriate as a general rule. The equal-sharing assumption is widely adopted 
by analysts and statistical agencies around the world, not only in the UK. The assumption and 
alternatives are analysed by Jenkins (1991). There is also the issue of whether the aggregate 
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‘income unit’ should be taken to be the household, or the more narrowly defined nuclear 
family. The National Equality Panel (2010) additionally provides information about the 
distribution of ‘individual incomes’ – the distribution arising were each adult to benefit only 
from the income that he or she received and be unaffected by that of other household 
members. 
 Estimates of income distributions using these definitions are derived in the UK using 
data from the Family Resources Survey, a large household survey that has been running since 
the early 1990s. Data for earlier years (back to 1961) come from the Family Expenditure 
Survey. At several points below, I supplement the survey-based estimates with information 
derived from income tax data from Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC). For 
assessing economic advantage (rather than poverty), tax data have benefits compared with 
household surveys because there is better coverage of the top of the income distribution and, 
arguably, measurement error may be less. In addition, sample sizes are much larger and some 
data series go back to the beginning of last century. On the other hand, the distributional 
definitions are less satisfactory because ‘income’ for tax purposes differs from the more 
comprehensive measures discussed earlier. The tax data definitions refer to gross taxable (or 
after-tax) income of tax units (which in the UK refer to individuals since 1990). Moreover, 
the most detailed data (from the Survey of Personal Incomes) refer to taxpayers rather than to 
the full population, thereby excluding all those in receipt of low (below tax) or zero incomes. 
 The final point to note about definitions is that this chapter is about income. Income is 
not the same as ‘consumption’, which refers to the resources actually enjoyed by households 
(measured in terms of their spending) rather than their potential command over resources. 
Income is arguably a better indicator of someone’s economic power, and not dependent on 
choices about how they spend their money. (For comparisons of distributions of consumption 
expenditure and income in the UK, see Brewer and O’Dea (2012).) Also, income and 
consumption each refer to flows per period, and should be distinguished from the stock of 
financial assets at a particular point in time, i.e. wealth. The distribution of wealth is the 
subject of Chapter 8. 
 
The UK income distribution, 2012–13 
 
The UK’s income distribution in 2012–13 (BHC definition) is pictured in Figure 7.1 The 
chart shows the numbers of individuals with (equivalised) incomes in each £10 band between 
zero and £1000 per week. The stripes classify individuals according to where they stand in 
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the income parade that orders them from poorest to richest. The poorest tenth (decile group 1) 
are on the left and the richest tenth (decile group 10) on the right, with the other eight decile 
groups in between. The frequency distribution is not bell-shaped as with a Normal 
distribution; rather, it is skewed with a long right-hand tail. Not all of the very richest 
individuals can be shown on the chart: the income of the person in the middle of richest tenth 
(the 95
th
 percentile) is £1,117 per week, and there are around 2.93 million people with 
incomes above this amount. 
The greatest concentration of individuals along the income range is between about 
£250 and £400 per week (the frequencies are greatest, and the stripes narrowest). The middle 
income (the median or 50
th
 percentile) is £440 per week, which is only 82% of the average 
(mean) income of £535 per week. The person with average income is found some two-thirds 
of the way along the income parade (i.e. between the 60
th
 and the 70
th
 percentile) and hence 
not particularly representative of ‘middle incomes’. Also shown in Figure 7.1 is the value of 
the most-commonly used poverty line in the UK and Europe (60 per cent of median income). 
The threshold was £264 per week in 2012–13, and it can be seen around 15 percent of 
individuals were income-poor in 2012–13. I provide more detail about the prevalence of 
disadvantage provided later in the chapter.  
Finally, observe the perhaps surprisingly large number of individuals with an income 
between £0 and £10 per week. Although this refers to fewer than 1 per cent of the UK 
population, the number raises questions about the accuracy of measurement of very low 
incomes. On this, see Brewer et al. (2009). 
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Figure 7.1. The UK income distribution, 2012–13 
 
Notes. Graph drawn by the author using data from the spreadsheet accompanying Chart 2.4 (BHC) in DWP 
(2014a). 
 
The HBAI data also tell us who the poorest and richest individuals were in 2012–13. 
Table 7.2 shows the composition of the poorest tenth and the richest tenth, using a range of 
subgroup definitions that classify individuals according to their or their family’s 
characteristics. 
 Table 7.2 shows, for example, that adult men and women and children are represented 
in the poorest tenth in proportion to their numbers in the population as a whole, but men are 
over-represented in the richest tenth (45 per cent compared to 38 per cent) and children are 
under-represented (16 per cent compared with 21 per cent). 
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Table 7.2. Composition of the poorest and richest tenths of the 2012–13 income 
distribution, by subgroup 
 Subgroup share (%) of: 
Subgroup Poorest tenth Richest tenth Population 
Sex and adulthood    
Adult man 38.6 45.0 38.3 
Adult woman 39.5 39.6 40.5 
Child 21.9 15.5 21.2 
Family type    
Pensioner couple 10.3 12.3 13.6 
Single male pensioner 1.9 1.3 1.9 
Single female pensioner 7.5 1.7 5.2 
Couple with children 32.4 32.6 34.9 
Single with children 10.1 1.0 8.0 
Couple without children 13.1 35.3 18.4 
Single male without children 16.0 10.9 10.8 
Single female without children 8.6 5.1 7.2 
Economic status     
One or more self employed 14.8 18.1 9.8 
Single/couple all in full time work 4.9 45.7 26.2 
Couple/one in full time, one part time 2.6 13.2 13.1 
Couple, one full time one not working 8.3 8.2 10.5 
No full time, one or more part time worker 15.0 5.2 10.1 
Workless, head or spouse aged 60 or over 20.7 6.7 17.3 
Workless head or spouse unemployed 14.6 0.7 3.8 
Workless, other inactive 19.2 2.3 9.3 
Region    
Rest of the UK 75.3 55.4 73.2 
London and South East 24.7 44.6 26.8 
Notes. Author’s estimates using data from the public-use file of unit-record HBAI data (accompanying DWP 
2014a). Reading note: 38.6% of the poorest tenth and 45.0% of the richest tenth in 2012–13 were adult men; 
38.3% of the total population were adult men. 
 
 Individuals from pensioner couples, and couples with and without children, are under-
represented in the poorest tenth relative to their numbers in the population as a whole (see 
Family type). Over-represented are single female pensioners, individuals in lone parent 
families, and childless singles. In the richest tenth, almost all groups are under-represented, 
with one striking exception. Childless couples are substantially over-represented, and account 
for more than one-third of the richest tenth though they comprise only 18 per cent of the 
population. 
 Looking at Economic status, Table 7.2 shows that over- and under-representation at 
the top and bottom is closely associated with participation in paid employment. For example, 
individuals in benefit units in which all adults are in full-time work are substantially under-
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represented in the poorest tenth (5 per cent compared with their population proportion of 26 
per cent) and substantially over-represented in the richest tenth (46 per cent compared to 26 
per cent). The situation is reversed for non-pensioner families in which the head or spouse is 
unemployed: individuals in this group comprise almost 4 per cent of the population, but 
nearly 15 per cent of the poorest tenth and less than 1 per cent of the richest tenth. By 
contrast, individuals belonging to a family with self-employment income are over-
represented in both the poorest and the richest tenths. The Region panel illustrates that, 
although there is no difference in the composition of the poorest tenth, people living in 
London and the South East form a substantially greater fraction of the richest tenth than 
would be expected from their relative numbers in the country as a whole (45 per cent 
compared to 27 per cent). 
 The range of incomes within each of the various subgroups is summarised in Figure 
7.2 using boxplots. The left and right hand ends of the box for each group show the 25
th
 and 
75
th
 percentiles for that group (half the group have incomes within this range). The end of the 
‘whisker’ extending left from the box shows the 10th percentile for the subgroup, whereas the 
end of the right whisker shows the 90
th
 percentile (80 per cent of the subgroup have incomes 
within the range spanned by the box and whiskers). Subgroup median income (50
th
 
percentile) is shown by the black bar within the box. The vertical dashed lines show the 10
th
, 
50
th
, and 90
th
 percentiles for the population as a whole (‘all individuals’; as also shown in 
Figure 7.1), and hence demarcate the thresholds used to define the poorest and richest income 
groups in Table 7.2. When the whisker crosses the horizontal lines, the subgroup is over-
represented in the top or bottom decile group, as we saw in Table 7.2. 
 The boxplots, therefore, illustrate both subgroup income levels and the range of 
subgroup incomes. Individuals in families with children, and dependent children in particular, 
tend to have lower incomes than other groups. Although the distribution among all women 
closely mimics that of the population as a whole, there are groups of women who are clearly 
worse off: look at the plots for single female pensioners and the ‘single with children’ group 
(most of whom are in families headed by lone mothers). In contrast, childless couples have 
relatively high incomes: almost three-quarters of this group have an income above the 
population median.  
Figure 7.2 highlights again the importance of paid employment for income, with 
distributions further to the left (lower) as the degree of participation falls. For example, 
contrast individuals in benefit units in which all individuals are in full-time work (more than 
75 per cent have an income above the population median) with individuals in a family with 
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an unemployed head or spouse (almost 90 per cent have an income below the population 
median). Families with self-employed members are a distinctive case because of the 
relatively high prevalence of both low incomes and (especially) very high incomes. 
Substantially more than one-tenth of this group have an income placing them in the richest 
five per cent of the population as a whole.  
 
Figure 7.2. Income distributions for population subgroups, UK, 2012–13  
 
Notes. Each subgroup’s boxplot shows the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles for the relevant subgroup: 
see the main text. The vertical dashed lines show the 10
th
, 50
th
, and 90
th
 percentiles for the population as a whole 
(‘all individuals’). Graph drawn by the author using data from the spreadsheet accompanying IFS (2014) for ‘all 
individuals’ and his calculations using data from the public-use file of unit-record HBAI data (accompanying 
DWP 2014a) for all other groups. Incomes in the public-use HBAI file are rounded to the nearest pound. 
 
The bottom of Figure 7.2 highlights the relative affluence of most individuals living in 
London and the South East. The person at the 75
th
 percentile for this region’s distribution is 
clearly within the richest twentieth of the population ranked by income (see Figure 7.1), 
whereas the corresponding person in the distribution for the rest of the UK is on the borders 
of the richest seventh and eighth tenths nationally. More than 10 per cent of individuals living 
in London and the South East are in the richest 5 per cent of the population. 
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7.2 Trends in real income levels since 1961 
 
Have looked at the contemporary distribution of income, I now consider how the distribution 
has changed over time. Conclusions about the extent to which real incomes have been rising 
depend a lot on how long one looks back and which part of the income distribution one 
considers. See Figure 7.3, which shows income levels at the 10
th
, 50
th
, and 90
th
 percentiles, as 
well as the mean. Grey stripes demarcate recessions. Appendix Table A1 summarises the 
trends shown in the graph, providing income growth rates for the period as a whole and 
subperiods within it. (All the Appendix tables and figures cited in this chapter are available at 
http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/case/cp/casepaper186.pdf.) 
Looking at the fifty-year period since 1961, the general picture is of rising incomes 
for all, punctuated by short periods of slow or negative growth accompanying recessions. The 
sharpest deviation from trend is the period after 2007, i.e. following the most recent 
recession, though it should be noted that a slowing in income growth is also apparent earlier – 
from the beginning of the 2000s – and there was also a period of little growth in the early-
1990s. 
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Figure 7.3. Trends in real income levels since 1961 
 
Notes. Graph drawn by the author using data from IFS (2014). The grey strips identify periods with at least two 
consecutive quarters of negative real GDP growth. p10, p50, and p90 are the 10
th
 percentile, 50
th
 percentile 
(median), and 90
th
 percentile, respectively. The data refer to financial years from 1994 onwards, and the 
estimates to the UK from 2002–03 and Great Britain in earlier years. See Appendix Table A1 for numerical 
estimates of growth rates for the period as a whole as well as subperiods. 
 
Also striking is the differential income growth across the income range: growth has 
been greatest at the top and small at the bottom. Over the five decades between 1961 and 
2012, the 90
th
 percentile grew by 130 per cent (equivalent to a rate of around 1.6% per year), 
the median grew by 97 per cent and the 10
th
 percentile by 89 per cent (equivalent to 1.3% per 
year in both cases). Although income falls were greatest for the richest groups between 2007 
and 2012 (the 90
th
 percentile fell by 6.2% per year; the 10
th
 percentile by 0.2% per year), this 
reversal of fortunes is small if compared with the longer-term trend of growing real incomes 
at the top.  
 The fall in real incomes across the income distribution after the most recent recession 
is not as dramatic as the squeeze on real wages reported by Gregg, Machin, and Fernández-
Salgado (2014), particularly at the bottom of the distribution. Several factors are likely to 
explain this. For example, a fall in real wages of one household member might be offset by 
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safety net income provided by benefits and tax credits has continued to provide a real income 
floor.  
 
 
Inequality  
 
The growing gap between top and bottom incomes shown in Figure 7.3 implies growth in 
income inequality. Inequality is summarised directly in Figure 7.4, in terms of the ratio of the 
90
th
 to the 10
th
 percentile (p90/p10) and the Gini coefficient. Regardless of which index is 
used, the rise in inequality over the last fifty years has been substantial: between 1961 and 
2012, the Gini rose by almost one-third and p90/p10 by around one half. Most of that 
inequality growth occurred in the 1980s. Clearly this is an exceptional period: within both the 
preceding two decades and the subsequent two, the two inequality series are relatively flat, 
with relatively small year-on-year changes. Nonetheless, there is a small but distinct decline 
in p90/p10 after 1991 that is not apparent in the Gini coefficient. This reflects changes in the 
distribution of incomes below the median to which the Gini is not as sensitive.  
Inequality declined during the most recent recession, reflecting the larger income falls 
for those at the top compared to those at the bottom, but even this inequality decline is 
relatively small and a bit smaller than the decline in the early- to mid-1970s (when inequality 
was much lower).  
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Figure 7.4. Income inequality since 1961 
 
Notes. Graph drawn by the author using data from IFS (2014). The data refer to financial years from 1994 
onwards, and the estimates to the UK from 2002–03 and Great Britain in earlier years. 
 
The level and trend in inequality in the UK is compared with those of 20 other OECD 
countries in Figure 7.5 (the distributional definitions are similar to those employed in 
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the average in the 21-country ranking (the OECD Gini was around 0.32) but, if middle-
income countries such as Mexico and Turkey are excluded, the UK shows up more clearly as 
a high-inequality country relative to other rich countries. Inequality in the UK is not as great 
as in the USA, however. 
Figure 7.5 also shows that the majority of OECD countries experienced inequality 
growth over the last quarter century; it was not only the UK. Moreover, the magnitude of the 
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mid-1980s Nonetheless, we can also see that an increase in inequality is not inevitable: 
inequality changed hardly at all in France, the Netherlands, and Belgium.  
 
Figure 7.5. Income inequality in 21 OECD countries: mid-1980s and 2011/12 
 
Notes. Graph drawn by the author using data in the spreadsheet accompanying OECD (2014, Figure 1). This 
source provides details of the actual years compared for each country. ‘Little change’ in inequality refers to 
changes of less than 1.5 percentage points. Countries are ordered within each panel by their Gini coefficient for 
2011/12. Income is household disposable income adjusted for household size. 
 
If the comparison is with the EU-15 as a whole, income inequality in the UK has been 
greater for most of the last decade but in 2013 was about the same. At the beginning of the 
2000s, the UK Gini was around four percentage points greater than the EU-15 Gini, but the 
former subsequently declined and the latter increased. (See Appendix Figure A2.)  
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subsequent six decades, the share declined by around 10 percentage points, but increased 
steadily thereafter albeit with a pause associated with the most recent recession. A U-shaped 
trend is also apparent for the shares of the top 1% and top 0.1%, though the inequality 
increases since the late 1970s have not taken the shares back to World War I levels. Also 
shown are trends in the shares of nearly-top groups variously defined (the series in grey) and, 
intriguingly, there is no distinct U-shape to these series to the extent that there is for the 
others. This implies that the U-shape trends for top income shares are mostly being driven by 
what is happening to the very richest group (the richest 0.1% in this case).  
 
Figure 7.6. Top income shares (%) in the UK over the last 100 years 
 
Notes. Graph drawn by the author using data from the World Top Incomes Database (Alvaredo et al. 2014). The 
vertical dashed line marks the change in the definition of the tax unit from the family to the individual in 1990.  
 
Thus, even though inequality in the UK has not grown much over the last two decades 
according to HBAI-based measures (Figure 7.4), the evidence from tax data about top income 
shares suggests a continuing and substantial rise in inequality over this period. Put 
differently, recent inequality trends are a story of greater differentials that are driven by 
increasing advantage of the best off. The UK experience is similar to that of other ‘Anglo’ 
countries such as the USA, but is less apparent in other countries such as Germany, and 
especially France where the long inequality decline has not been followed by a large 
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inequality rise. See Appendix Figure A3 and, for more extensive cross-national comparisons, 
Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez (2011). 
 
 
The prevalence of poverty 
 
Historically, social policy has been particularly concerned with the prevalence of poverty 
rather than other aspects of income distribution (see Chapter 1). As this volume makes clear, 
one should think of the organisation of society along a continuum of advantage and 
disadvantage, and looking at the whole of the income distribution reflects this position. 
Nonetheless, the situation of the worse-off people in society is often of pressing interest 
because of individual welfare considerations. Trends in income poverty are therefore the 
subject of this section. 
 A fundamental issue is how the income cut-off that differentiates poor people from 
non-poor people should be defined. The threshold most commonly employed by the 
European Union, and the UK as well, is 60 per cent of contemporary national median income. 
The ‘contemporary national’ tag means that the poverty line varies from one year to the next 
(as median income changes), and differs in real terms across countries: UK median income is 
substantially greater than Romanian median income, for instance.  
This ‘relative poverty’ definition implements – in a particular way – the idea that 
‘[p]eople are said to be living in poverty if their income and resources are so inadequate as to 
preclude them from having a standard of living considered acceptable in the society in which 
they live’ (Council of the European Union, 2004: 8). Although a relative poverty definition 
has many conceptual attractions, it can lead to implausible estimates in times of economic 
boom or sharp recession when the median income itself can change substantially (Jenkins et 
al., 2013: chapter 1).  
This suggests that more ‘absolute’ poverty threshold definitions be employed in 
tandem with relative ones. However, few would seriously argue that a fully absolute 
definition – a real income cut-off that is fixed over time and the same for all countries – is 
appropriate for rich countries such as the UK. More commonly used for assessing trends are 
‘anchored’ poverty lines. The idea is that poverty in the current year and previous years be 
assessed using a threshold that is fixed at the value of the relative poverty line for an earlier 
(but relatively recent) year. Thus, DWP HBAI publications supplement estimates based on a 
cut-off of 60 per cent of contemporary national median income with estimates based on a 
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threshold equal to 60 per cent of 2010–11 median income or (previously) the 1998–99 
median. The Institute for Fiscal Studies has provided data on anchored poverty rates using the 
1996–97 median, which I use here alongside those for the 2010–11 median. Estimates of 
poverty rates for the last fifty years based on the relative and two anchored thresholds are 
shown in Figure 7.7. 
 
Figure 7.7. Poverty rates (%) since 1961: relative and anchored poverty lines  
 
Notes. Graph drawn by the author using data from IFS (2014). The data refer to financial years from 1994 
onwards, and the estimates to the UK from 2002–03 and Great Britain in earlier years. The BHC income 
definition is used (see text). 
 
 Clearly, the choice of low-income cut-off makes a substantial difference to estimates 
of both the prevalence of poverty in recent years, and its trend over time. Using the relative 
poverty line based on contemporary medians, the poverty rate fluctuated between around 12 
per cent and 15 per cent in the twenty years after 1961, then increased sharply to reach more 
than 20 per cent in the late-1980s, and has been gradually declining since the early 1990s. In 
particular, the poverty rate continued to decline during the recent recession – because the 
median also fell (Figure 7.3). According to the relative poverty line definition, the UK 
poverty rate in 2012–13 was 15.4 per cent, corresponding to around 9.7 million poor people.  
 The poverty experience differs for particular subgroups. Of particular relevance for 
policy in recent years has been child poverty and pensioner poverty. At the beginning of the 
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1990s, the child poverty rate was nearly 10 percentage points higher than the all-persons rate, 
but it has declined at a faster pace and was only two percentage points larger in 2012–13. The 
decline in pensioner poverty rates has been substantial, from around 40 per cent in the 1960s 
to the same as the all-persons rate in 2012–13, albeit with large increases and declines in 
between. See Appendix Figure A4 for details. For more extended discussion of long-run 
trends, see Cribb et al. (2013: chapter 5). 
 These estimates are based on a BHC income definition. If, instead, an AHC income 
definition is used, the picture of poverty levels and trends is different, especially since the 
1990s. In 1990, the AHC relative poverty rate was 24 per cent (compared to a BHC rate of 21 
per cent) but did not decline at the same rate thereafter. In 2012–13, the AHC relative poverty 
rate was 21 per cent (13.2 million people), i.e. around six percentage points greater than the 
BHC rate for that year. See Appendix Figure A5 for details. 
 The BHC series based on anchored poverty lines show a substantial decline in poverty 
rates over the last five decades. For example, according to the relative poverty standards of 
the mid-1990s, more than half of the UK population was poor in the early 1960s, but only 
one-tenth five decades later. The rate of decline in both anchored series slows noticeably 
from around 2000 onwards – which is unsurprising given the slowing of income growth rates 
at the bottom of the distribution around that time (Figure 7.3). Observe as well, and by 
contrast with the relative poverty series, that both anchored poverty series show a rise in the 
poverty rate with the recent recession (albeit a relatively small one).  
The UK had a relative poverty rate two or three percentage points higher than the EU-
15 average from 1995 until around 2009, after which the rates converged: the UK rate 
declined (reflecting the falling UK median) and the EU-15 rate increased slightly. See Figure 
7.8. Again, using anchored poverty lines for each country (60 per cent of national medians in 
2008) reveals a different picture for the post-recession period. In particular, both the UK and 
EU-15 poverty rates are estimated to increase by around two percentage points in the 
following four years, and so the differential is maintained. 
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Figure 7.8. Poverty rates (%) using relative and anchored thresholds: UK and EU-15 
average 
 
Note. Graph drawn by author using EU-SILC-based estimates reported in Eurostat (2014, 
series ilc_li02 and ilc_li22b). The solid lines show poverty rates calculated using a relative 
threshold (60% of contemporary national median income); the dashed lines show poverty 
rates calculated using an anchored threshold (60% of national median income in 2008). 
Estimates of anchored poverty rates are available only from 2008 onwards.  
 
 
The prevalence of affluence 
 
The prevalence of affluence can also be assessed in terms of relative and anchored thresholds 
and, again, the specific choice is somewhat arbitrary. (The few researchers who have looked 
at the prevalence of affluence have used a range of definitions; there are no commonly-
precedents as in the poverty case. There is also the problem that the higher the threshold , the 
more statistically unreliable the estimates may be.) For the purposes of this chapter, I use 
twice the contemporary median as a relative threshold, and a fixed real income threshold 
equal to £1,000 per week in 2012–13 prices. 
Estimates using these two thresholds are shown in Figure 7.9, and derived from the 
same data that are used to compile the DWP’s HBAI statistics. The proportion of persons 
with an income greater than twice the contemporary median has remained remarkably stable 
since the mid-1990s, at around 11 per cent. (Remember that the median, and hence the value 
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of twice-median threshold also rose over this period: Figure 7.3.) The figure also highlights 
substantial differences in the prevalence of affluence in London and the South East (a rate of 
around 17 per cent over the last two decades) with the its prevalence in the rest of the UK (a 
rate of around 8 per cent).  
 With the fixed £1,000-per-week threshold, the prevalence of affluence steadily 
increased, more than doubling from around 4 per cent in the mid-1990s to around 9 per cent 
in 2009, after which the rate fell by several percentage points. Again, individuals living in 
London and the South East had higher rates than those in the rest of the UK throughout the 
period, but the trends for each group mimicked the national picture. 
 
Figure 7.9. Percentages of individuals with an equivalised income greater than twice the 
contemporary median (dotted lines) or greater than £1000 per week (2012–13 
prices) (solid lines) 
 
Notes. Graph drawn by the author using public-use files of HBAI unit record data accompanying DWP (2014a). 
The income definition is the same as the BHC definition used in Figures 7.1–7.4. The data refer to financial 
years from 1994 onwards, and the estimates to the UK from 2002–03 and Great Britain in earlier years. 
 
The advantage of summaries such as Figure 7.9 is that they use the definitions of income and 
income-receiving unit routinely used to assess the income distribution in the UK. However, 
as discussed earlier, the coverage of the very top incomes in the underlying household survey 
data is not as good as that in income tax data.  
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Changes in the prevalence of affluence in the UK between 1995–96 and 2010–11 
estimated from income tax data are summarised in Figure 7.10 using two absolute thresholds: 
£500,000 per year and £1,000,000 per year of after-tax income in 2012–13 prices. (These 
thresholds are substantially higher than the £1000 (equivalised) per week used for Figure 
7.9.) By HBAI standards, an income above these cut-offs would place a person well into the 
top 1 per cent of the income distribution. These estimates refer to proportions of all 
taxpayers, not to proportions of the population as a whole (or to proportions of all adults as in 
the top income shares discussion). Most non-taxpayers have little or no income. (In 2010–11, 
there were around 31.3 million taxpayers, but the UK population was around 60 million, so to 
be expressed as fractions of the population or all adults, the percentages shown in the figure 
would need to be adjusted downwards.) 
 
Figure 7.10. Percentages of taxpayers with an after-tax income greater than £500,000 
and greater than £1 million pounds per year (2012–13 prices)  
 
Notes. Years shown are financial years, e.g. 2010 refers to 2010–11. The data refer to taxpayers only, and are 
not available for 2008–09. Data for 1995–96 are not used because of a series discontinuity (introduction of self-
assessment and changes to the SPI methodology). Graph drawn by the author using data from the public-use 
files of the Survey of Personal Incomes (various years). Incomes converted to 2012–13 prices using within-year 
averages of the monthly Consumer Price Index for each financial year. 
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0.02 per cent to nearly 0.10 per cent. The growth in the prevalence of taxpayers with an after-
tax income of more than £1 million per year is more muted. The proportion remained at 
around 0.01 per cent from the mid-1990s until the early 2000s, but increased thereafter and 
by 2009–10 it was some three times higher. (The numbers of taxpayers involved is still only a 
few thousand.) 
 The marked rise in the prevalence of affluence appears to go into reverse after 2009–
10, with both series showing much lower rates for 2010–11, with the fraction of millionaire 
taxpayers roughly halving for example. One obvious explanation for this reversal of fortunes 
is the recent recession. However, other more subtle changes mean that one has to be cautious 
about interpreting the 2010–11 estimates. In particular, a 50 per cent marginal rate of income 
tax was introduced in April 2010, and the announcement and introduction of this tax rate 
provided incentives for high income tax payers to bring forward income to 2009–10 that 
would otherwise have been reported in 2010–11 income tax returns or possibly later years.  
This is the process of ‘forestalling’, discussed in more detail by HM Revenue and 
Customs (2012) and Cribb et al. (2012, 2013). Reverse forestalling in reaction to the 
reduction of the top marginal tax rate to 45 per cent (from April 2013) is also likely to affect 
reporting for later years. These issues make assessment of recent trends in the income 
distribution problematic for any summary measure that is calculated using top incomes, 
including the Gini inequality index (Cribb et al., 2013). However, the effects on the Gini (cf. 
Figure 7.4) are likely to be minor compared to their effects on estimates of the prevalence of 
affluence based on fixed real income thresholds as in Figure 7.9 and especially Figure 7.10.  
The growth in affluence is shown for selected subgroups in Figure 7.11 using a 
threshold of £100,000 per year (2012–13 prices). The chart shows that such high after-tax 
incomes are much more prevalent among male taxpayers than female taxpayers, and among 
taxpayers in London and the South East than among all taxpayers. Prevalence rates rose for 
all groups between the mid-1990s and the onset of the late-2000s recession. Figure 7.11 also 
highlights the relatively large prevalence of high incomes among taxpayers working in the 
financial industry: in 1997–98 about 2½ per cent of this group had after-tax incomes over the 
£100,000 threshold; in 2009–10, the proportion was 7 per cent. 
For further discussion of top incomes through to the mid-2000s, the income tax data, 
and comparisons with HBAI series, see Brewer, Sibieta, and Wren-Lewis (2008). On recent 
trends in top wage income, see Bell and Van Reenen (2013). 
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Figure 7.11. Percentages of taxpayers with an after-tax income greater than £100,000 
per year (2012–13 prices), by subgroup 
 
Notes. Years shown are financial years, e.g. 2010 refers to 2010–11. The data refer to taxpayers only, and are 
not available for 2008–09. Data for 1995–96 are not used because of a series discontinuity (introduction of self-
assessment and changes to the SPI methodology). Graph drawn by the author using data from the public-use 
files of the Survey of Personal Incomes (various years). Incomes converted to 2012–13 prices using within-year 
averages of the monthly Consumer Price Index for each financial year. Reading note: 7% of taxpayers working 
in the financial industry had an after-tax income of more than £100,000 in financial year 2009–10. 
 
 
Income mobility and poverty dynamics 
 
The perspectives on distributional trends employed so far do not take account of the fact that 
someone who is poor in one year may be non-poor in the following year (or vice versa). 
Similarly, there is mobility into and out of middle- and top-income groups. The group of 
people that is poor – or rich – is not fixed over time.  
Evidence about income mobility throughout the income range is displayed in Table 
7.3. Individuals are classified by their quintile group origins in 2000 and their income group 
membership is tracked over the following eight years. The table shows that mobility is 
common but most of it is relatively short-distance. Only around one-seventh of individuals in 
the poorest fifth in 2000 remained in the poorest fifth in all nine years, though nearly one half 
spent all or the majority of years in that group. But this also means that 45 per cent spent the 
majority of years in the period in a higher income group. At first glance, downward mobility 
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among those who were in the richest fifth in 2000 is less common than upward mobility from 
the poorest fifth, since just over a quarter of individuals with richest-fifth origins remained 
there all years, but around 40 per cent spent the majority of years in a lower income group. 
There is more scope for both upward and downward mobility for those starting in the middle: 
around two-thirds of those in the middle fifth in 2000 spent significant periods in a different 
income group. 
 
Table 7.3. Where in the income distribution individuals spent the majority of their time 
over the nine-year period, 2000–2008 
 Quintile group in 2000 
 Bottom 
(poorest) 
Second Third Fourth Top 
(richest) 
All 
individuals 
All years in the same quintile group as 
2000   14     3     2     4   26   10 
Majority of years in same quintile 
group as 2000 
  41   36   32   36   34   36 
Majority of years above 2000 quintile 
group 
  45   31   25   16 …   23 
Majority of years below 2000 quintile 
group 
…   14   25   29   40   22 
None of the above …   17   15   16 …     9 
All individuals 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Notes. ‘Majority of years in same quintile group’ row: five or more years out of nine in the same quintile group 
as in base-year but does not include the individuals in the ‘All years in same quintile’ row. ‘None of the above’ 
implies that the individual has neither remained in the same quintile group as the base-year, nor been in a higher 
or lower quintile group for five of the nine years. ‘…’: no estimate (not logically possible given definitions of 
groups). Source: Department for Work and Pensions (2010, Tables 3.2 (BHC) and 3.3 (BHC)), derived from 
British Household Panel Survey data. See Appendix Table A2 for corresponding estimates for the 1990s. 
 
 Despite the changes in the income distribution during the 1990s and 2000s shown 
earlier, the patterns of mobility were very similar in the two decades. See Appendix Table A3 
which provides estimates for the two periods in the same format as Table 7.3. The no-change 
conclusion is also reported by Jenkins (2011) using an extensive portfolio of mobility 
measures. 
 The experience of poverty is likely to be more detrimental the longer that it is 
experienced; thus, there is particular interest in the extent of poverty persistence. Information 
about trends in poverty persistence is provided by Figure 7.12. This shows the distribution of 
the number of times that individuals are poor within successive four-year periods. (The first 
calculation is for 1991–1994 and then the observation window is moved along a year at a 
time; the latest period is 2005–2008. The BHPS ended in 2008.) Using DWP (2010) 
definitions, an individual is persistently poor if he or she is poor three or four times in the 
four-year period. Figure 7.12 shows that since the mid-1990s, the persistent poverty rate has 
declined substantially, by around one-third from 15 per cent to nearly 10 per cent, between 
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the first four-year period and the one beginning in 2004. Over the same period, the number of 
people experiencing occasional poverty (one or two years poor in a four-year period) 
increased slightly, and the proportion never poor increased from 65 per cent to 70 per cent. 
As the recession hit, however, the earlier trends reversed somewhat. For example, for the 
2005–2008 period, the proportion persistently poor was around two percentage points higher 
than for the previous four-year period, and the proportion never poor fell by roughly the same 
amount. 
 The downward trend in persistent poverty prior to the late-2000s recession reflects 
improvements that were greatest for families with children, especially lone parent families, 
and also single pensioners. See Jenkins (2011: chapter 8) for details. 
 
Figure 7.12 Percentages of individuals poor once, twice, or three or more times in a 
four-year period, by year 
 
Notes. Author’s calculations from British Household Panel Survey data (Levy and Jenkins, 2012). Year labels 
refer to the first year of each four-year period, e.g. ‘1991’ refers to the years 1991–1994. The poverty line for 
each year is 60% of median net household income (BHC). Poverty counts refer to poverty status around the date 
of the annual BHPS interview. 
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Concluding remarks 
 
Although social policy has often treated poverty as the main feature of the income 
distribution of interest, recent distributional trends in the UK suggest that other features 
demand as much attention and analysis. This chapter has drawn attention to the stagnation in 
real income growth for those at the bottom while at the same time incomes at the top have 
been growing, particularly at the very top. Issues for the UK of contemporary concern are as 
much the growth in the prevalence of advantage rather than disadvantage – growing 
inequality as much as poverty. 
 The reasons why the growth in economic inequality is an important social issue 
nowadays are threefold: there are views that greater inequality may have deleterious 
consequences for economic growth, that greater income inequality is associated with greater 
inequalities in many other spheres, and that the higher incomes are not fairly achieved. 
 The relationship between inequality and economic growth has long been controversial 
but recent research concludes that, among OECD countries, ‘when income inequality rises, 
economic growth falls. One reason is that poorer members of society are less able to invest in 
their education. Tackling inequality can make our societies fairer and our economies 
stronger’ (OECD, 2014: 1). Others have emphasised that stagnation in incomes at the bottom 
has been accompanied by unsustainable growth in household debt that may have led to the 
recent financial crisis or at least hindered recovery from it. For a review of evidence, see 
Lucchino and Morelli (2012).  
 There is a growing literature arguing that income inequality growth is harmful 
because it weakens the fabric of our society and social cohesion in its broadest sense. The 
fabric is represented by a shared experience of a common education system, health service, 
and pensions, as well as fundamental democratic principles such as one-person one-vote and 
equality before the law. The problem is that the very rich may increasingly opt out of, or be 
less willing to contribute to, the collective pot that finances benefits and services, or deploy 
their resources to secure outcomes that are favourable to their own interests via politics, 
media, or the law. (This is the idea of top incomes reflect ‘rent seeking’ behaviour rather than 
fairly reflecting talents, or skills.) To date, the literature on this topic has mostly been about 
the USA, no doubt reflecting the fact that inequality levels and inequality growth have been 
greater there than in the UK. (See, for example, Bartels (2008), Hacker and Pierson (2010), 
and Stiglitz (2012).) Given the distributional trends in the UK that have been described in this 
chapter, analysis of their consequences is clearly an important topic on this side of the 
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Atlantic as well. Extensive discussion of what can be done about economic inequality is 
provided by Atkinson (2015). These issues are developed further in the Concluding chapter. 
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